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Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of conversion to REIT status by former listed
property companies in the United Kingdom on the level of institutional ownership during the period of
2007–2016.
Design/methodology/approach – This paper uses an event study framework to track the change in
institutional ownership three years before and after a REIT conversion event. This event study approach
circumvents the sample selection bias issue associated with the conversion event wherein the decision to
convert to REIT is likely to be endogenous.
Findings – Panel regression analysis reveals that changing to REIT status led to a 12.8 and 15.2% increase
in institutional ownership and number of institutional investors, respectively. The first order of priority in
institutional investors’ investment in REIT shares is their preference for liquidity. Further analysis shows
that institutional investors changed their preferences towards characteristics associated with systematic risk,
firm age and liquidity after the conversion event by becoming less averse to firm-specific risk, placing more
emphasis on firm age and less emphasis on systematic risk and liquidity.
Practical implications – Overall, conversion to REIT status helps increase former property companies’
investor base, which is in line with the regulator’s aim to open up the property market to a wide range of
investors through the introduction of a REIT regime. Findings from this paper also have policy implications for
countries that are considering a REIT regime for their capital market and existing REIT regimes without a
formal conversion mechanism.
Originality/value – This paper offers, for the first time, evidence on 1) how conversion to REITs influences
firms’ institutional ownership and 2) the determinants of converted REITs’ institutional ownership.
Keywords REIT conversion, UK REITs, Institutional ownership, Number of institutional investors, REIT
regime, REIT status
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
An extensive body of research has examined the determinants of institutional ownership.
The central findings from this strand of literature are as follows. First, institutional
ownership of US common stock has increased dramatically over the past 60 years, from 7% in
1950 to 50% in 1999 (Bennett et al., 2003) and to 61% in 2014 (Franks, 2020). Second, certain
firm characteristics proxied for institutional investors’ motives for liquidity, prudent
investment and trading strategy are consistently found to be significantly related to the level
of institutional ownership (Del Guercio, 1996; Gompers and Metrick, 2001). Third,
institutional investors’ preferences towards these firm characteristics tend to change over
time (Bennett et al., 2003; Devos et al., 2013). Bennett et al. (2003), for instance, document that
institutional investors in the USA have shifted their preferences towards smaller and riskier
securities with the aim of maximizing risk-adjusted performance.
The literature on REIT institutional ownership documents the dramatic increase in
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from less than 10% during the pre-1990s period (Wang et al., 1992) to 41.7% in the post-1990s
period (Ling and Ryngaert, 1997). This was due to the change in REIT regulations that
increased the acceptance of REITs among institutional investors in the post-1990s period. In
particular, the relaxation of the look-through ownership requirement that used to constrain
institutional investors’ investment in REIT. Specifically, since 1993, institutional investors
are no longer considered as a single stockholder where their ownerships are passed through
to their beneficiaries (Chung et al., 2010). This avoids the breaching of the closely held
ownership rule (“five or fewer” rule) by institutional investors and makes them, collectively,
the main shareholders of REIT shares in the USA [1].
Existing REIT literature on institutional investors focusses primarily on the impact of
institutional ownership on firm performance (Graff and Young, 1997; Downs, 1998; Friday
et al., 1999; Chung et al., 2010) and corporate governance (Feng et al., 2010; Hartzell et al., 2006)
arising from the monitoring roles of institutional investors. Generally, findings from this
strand of literature support the monitoring roles of institutional investors in reducing the
agency problem, thus enhancing the performance and efficiency of REITs. The literature on
the determinants of REIT institutional ownership, on the other hand, is relatively scant.
Focussing on institutional ownership change surrounding the global financial crisis (GFC),
Devos et al. (2013) document that institutional investors place more emphasis on managing
risk during the GFC by reducing their holding of risky REITs while increasing their holding
of larger REITs. An earlier study by Ciocheitti et al. (2002) finds that institutional investors
prefer larger and more liquid REITs. Consistent with their liquidity-constraint hypothesis,
liquidity variables (stock price, trading volume and market price) are found to be positively
related to institutional ownership.
In this paper, I examine the impact of conversion to REITs by existing listed property
companies on the level of institutional ownership. I do this by focussing on a sample of UK listed
property companies that opted to convert to REITs when the REIT regime was first introduced
in the United Kingdom on 1 January 2007. This research question is important for institutional
investors, because they are the main investors in the UK stock market, having a 78% equity
holding in UK listed firms at the end of 2014 (Franks, 2020). Research has shown the positive
impact of institutional investors on firm value due to their monitoring roles and the reputation
effects associated with institutional investment. The monitoring roles of institutional investors
minimize the agency problems and inefficiencies in information dissemination, which, in turn,
increases firms’ liquidity and reduces trading costs. The reputation impact is particularly
important for UKREITs thatmade their debut in the capitalmarket in 2007. The participation of
institutional investors may bolster investors’ confidence in the UK REITs and attract the
attention of financial analysts during the early stage of the REIT sector’s inception.
I track the change in institutional ownership for each of the converted REITs, three years
before and after they were converted to REITs. This event study approach allows me to
circumvent sample selection bias issues, because the conversion decision is likely to be
endogenous. Conversion probability should be higher for property companies with
characteristics that are closer to the requirements of REIT regulation. Importantly, this
approach provides me a natural experiment setting to investigate the change in the
preference of institutional investors following the adoption of REIT regulation, which is more
stringent and transparent than listing rules for conventional companies.
This paper is most closely related to that of Brounen et al. (2013), who examine the change
in performance and firm characteristics of firms converted to REITs in France, Germany, the
United Kingdom and the USA [2]. The authors find that firms that converted to REITs
experience a decrease in systematic risk (beta) and leverage, a small increase in stock
turnover levels and an increase in dividend payouts. The authors also find support for their
hypothesis that converted REITs’ dividend announcement effects are less informative
following their adoption of REIT standards that strip away managers’ discretion in dividend
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payout policy. In particularly, the stock price reaction to changes in dividends weakens after
the conversion event. This paper is also related to literature that examines the impact of the
changes in financial regulation (regime) on stock liquidity (Avgouleas and Degiannakis,
2009), underpricing (Ljungqvist andWilhelm, 2003), stock price volatility (Bushee et al., 2004)
and house foreclosures (Mian et al., 2015).
This paper attempts to contribute to the REIT literature in three ways. First, I examine for
the first time the impact of the REIT regime on institutional ownership by tracking the level of
institutional ownership for the same property company before and after converting to REIT.
Attracting institutional investment and creating a diversified investor base have been
mentioned as motives to embrace the REIT regime by the regulators worldwide. So far, there
is a dearth in the literature as towhether these objectiveswere achieved after the REIT regime
was introduced. Second, I complement Brounen et al. (2013) by offering a more detailed
analysis of converted UK REITs using a larger sample and adopting a multivariate
framework. The evidence provided by Brounen et al. (2013) for the UK REITs is mostly
descriptive in nature and does not consider the change in ownership structure of converted
REITs. Third, this paper add to the scant literature on UK REITs. To the best of my
knowledge, there are only four published papers on UK REITs in primary UK and Europe
property journals. These are the papers of Baum and Devaney (2008), who examine the
impact of depreciation and expenditure on UK REITs’ income and distribution; Ke (2015),
who examines the determinants of net asset value (NAV) discount for both listedUK property
companies and REITs; Newell and Marzuki (2016), who examine risk-adjusted performance
and portfolio diversification benefits of UK-REITs in a mixed-asset portfolio; and Jadevicius
and Lee (2017), who examine the existence of calendar anomalies in the UK REITs.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I provide institutional background
information for the UK REIT sector and further develop my testable hypotheses. Section 3
describes the methodology and data used in this study. Section 4 presents my empirical
analysis, and the final section concludes.
2. Institutional background and hypothesis development
2.1 Institutional background
The REIT regime was introduced in the United Kingdom on 1 Jan 2007. Similar to REITs in
other developed countries, UK REITs are exempted from corporate tax as long as they can
comply with the standard REIT rules/tests such as dividend distribution (90% of net rental
revenue), asset/profits test (75% from property rental business) and ownership (five or fewer
rules) [3]. Related to the ownership rule is the 10% substantial shareholder rule that imposes a
20% tax charge on dividends paid to corporate shareholders owningmore than 10% of REIT
shares. UK REITs, however, can amend their Articles of Association to avoid this tax subject
to the demonstration to the UK government that they have put in place a mechanism to avoid
such as a distribution being paid. F&CUKReal Estate Investment Ltd, for instance, amended
its Article of Association to give power to the board to pay dividend to its substantial
shareholder, Friends Life Limited, provided that the latter holds no more than its current
14.2% in the REIT. Readers are referred to EPRA (2016) andMoss (2018) for a comprehensive
and detailed discussion of the UK REIT regime.
Table 1 shows that the UK REIT sector has the largest number of listed REITs (36) and
market capitalization (V56.9bn) in Europe as of August 2016. This was followed by France
and the Netherlands, with sector market capitalization ofV49.4bn andV29.1bn, respectively.
These three markets collectively garnered 79.11% of total REIT market capitalization in
Europe. All REIT markets in Europe (except for Lithuania) have clear conversion rules that
allow existing listed companies with characteristics that pass the REIT tests to elect to
convert to REITs. Except for the United Kingdom, Bulgaria and Greece, conversion is a





transfer of properties to a REIT is payable to the government in return for REIT status.
The prevalence of conversion features among European REITs is in stark contrast to REITs
in the Asia Pacific region such as Australia, Japan, Hong Kong and Singapore, where
conversion regulation is absent from the REIT regulation. REITs in this region are newly
formed companies that went through the normal initial public offering (IPO) process.
There are four pull factors that encourage existing property companies in the United
Kingdom to change to REIT status. The first of these is the cash saving from conversion to
REIT. This is achieved through corporate tax exemption and the reduction of deferred tax
liability on properties disposed prior to conversion. UKREITs are exempted from capital gain
tax on disposals of assets used in the property rental business. The British Land Company
PLC, the largest listed property company (measured by total assets) in Europe in 2006 that
chose to convert to REIT, cited a total deferred tax saving of £1.7bn, which was more than
offset the £0.315bn entry charge for conversion to REIT, as one of the benefits of its
conversion (British Land Company, 2006). This one-off entry charge (2% over total market
value of real estate) was eventually abolished by the UK regulator on 17 July 2012.
Second, the conversion process is relatively simple and straightforward for those
companies that have obtained conversion approval from their shareholders. As shown in
Table 2, it took less than onemonth (22 days) from the Extraordinary General Meeting (EGM)


















2007 36 56.858 33.24 Yes No conversion
charge since 2012
France 2003 32 49.357 28.85 Yes 19% on capital gain
Netherlands 1969 5 29.124 17.02 Yes Tax on capital gain
at regular corporate
tax rates
Belgium 1995 17 11.027 6.45 Yes 12.75% on capital
gain (15% from 1
January 2020)
Spain 2009 5 7.806 4.56 Yes 25% capital gain
tax
Germany 2007 4 2.797 1.63 Yes Conversion event is
treated as a taxable
event
Ireland 2013 3 2.416 1.41 Yes 33% capital gain
tax
Italy 2007 3 2.172 1.27 Yes 20% tax on capital
gain
Greece 1999 4 1.817 1.06 Yes No
Bulgaria 2004 53 0.865 0.51 Yes No
Finland 2009 1 0.075 0.04 Yes 20% tax on capital
gain
Hungary 2011 – – – Yes N/A
Lithuania 2013 – – – No N/A
Luxembourg 2007 – – – Yes Conversion event is
treated as a taxable
event





Barrie, was quoted as saying that: “Apart from our conversion charge, the cost of becoming a
REIT is one fax to the Inland Revenue: 2p for the paper and 10p to send the fax: that’s how
simple it is” (PropertyWeek, 2006). Third, for potential converts with firm characteristics that
meet the REIT tests (i.e. high rental business, high dividend payout and diverse ownership
structure), these firms can maintain their existing business policy and corporate structure
upon conversion to REITs. Converted REITs are allowed to keep their other non-property
rental business such as property development/trading or management as long as they
constitute no more than 25% of the REIT total assets. Income generated from these residual
businesses, however, is subject to corporate tax. Fourth, conversion to REITmakes property
companies more liquid and transparent in the eyes of investors due to the stringent REIT
rules and access to the REIT “brand” that is widely accepted among international portfolio
managers. This may improve the company’s valuation and investor base, facilitating their
ability to raise fresh capital for growth in the future.
Figure 1 shows that the total number of UK REITs increased from 19 to 32 during the
period from 2007 to 2016, while market capitalization doubled from ₤27bn to ₤45.8bn during
the same period. Most REITs entered the capital market during the first year of inception of
the UK REIT regime in 2007. A total of 19 companies elected to become REITs in 2007, of
which 16 REITs were converted from listed property companies while the remaining three
REITs are newREIT IPOs [4]. These converted REITswere among the largest listed property
companies in the United Kingdom. Since then, the increase has been slowed partly due to
unfavourable market conditions (i.e. the GFC) and partly due to unattractive REIT rules, such
as the 2% entry charge, ownership and listing restrictions imposed on the new entrants.
Amendment to these rules was subsequently made in the Finance Act of 2012. Specifically,
the 2% entry charge was abolished, and newREIT entrants were provided a three-year grace
period to fulfil the listing and maximum 10% single corporate shareholder requirements.
No REIT name EGM notice EGM date Conversion date
1. A & J Mucklow Group Plc 30-Apr-07 23-May-07 1-Jul-07
2. Assura Plc 28-Jan-13 15-Feb-13 1-Apr-13
3. Big Yellow Group Plc 11-Apr-07 4-May-07 15-Jan-07
4. British Land Company Plc 28-Nov-06 20-Dec-06 1-Jan-07
5. Brixton Inc (delisted) NA NA 1-Jan-07
6. Capital & Regional Plc 13-Nov-14 2-Dec-14 31-Dec-14
7. Derwent London Plc 31-May-07 26-Jun-07 1-Jul-07
8. F&C UK Real Estate Investments Limited 25-Nov-14 19-Dec-14 1-Jan-15
9. Great Portland Estates Plc 15-Nov-06 13-Dec-06 1-Jan-07
10. Hammerson Plc 20-Nov-06 13-Dec-06 1-Jan-07
11. Hansteen Holdings Plc 7-Sep-09 25-Sep-09 6-Oct-09
12. Highcroft Investments Plc 13-Nov-07 13-Dec-07 1-Apr-08
13. Intu Properties Plc 22-Nov-06 18-Dec-06 1-Jan-07
14. Land Securities Group Plc NA 15-Dec-06 1-Jan-07
15. McKay Securities Plc 5-Feb-07 28-Feb-07 1-Apr-07
16. Primary Health Properties Plc 20-Nov-06 18-Dec-06 1-Jan-07
17. Real Estate Investors Plc 4-Dec-14 23-Dec-14 1-Jan-15
18. Redefine International Plc 6-Nov-13 29-Nov-13 4-Dec-13
19. Schroder Real Estate Investment Trust Limited 31-Mar-15 28-Apr-15 1-May-15
20. SEGRO Plc NA 14-Dec-06 1-Jan-07
21. Shaftesbury PLC 23-Feb-07 19-Mar-07 1-Apr-07
22. Standard Life Investments Property Income Trust 29-Oct-14 20-Nov-14 1-Jan-15
23. Town Centre Securities Plc 7-Sep-07 1-Oct-07 2-Oct-07
24. Warner Estate Holdings Plc (delisted) 28-Feb-07 23-Mar-07 1-Apr-07







This amendment means that new entrants to the REIT regime are given three years to meet
the listing and ownership requirements upon conversion to REIT. This three-year grace
period is also given to small and growth firms listed on London Stock Exchange’s AIM.
These firms are not required tomeet UKREIT’s listing requirements in the first three years in
which they are a UK REIT. This positive reform in REIT regulation led to the addition of 11
new REITs between 2013 and 2016.
2.2 Hypothesis development
Aproperty companymay fall under the radar of institutional investors upon being converted
to REIT due to the positive attributes of REIT structure. Chief among these is the exemption
from corporate tax that allows investors to enjoy stable dividend income while avoiding
double taxation incurred prior to the conversion. The stringent REIT regulation further
reduces the potential agency issues, thus improving the liquidity and transparency of
converted REITs. Moreover, access to the “REIT” brand that is widely accepted as the
favourable property ownership may now attract institutional investors who may have been
previously prevented from investing in non-REIT entities. In sum, I hypothesize that
conversion to REIT status leads to a significant increase in the institutional ownership and
the number of institutional investors in REIT shares.
Given the change in the risk and return profile upon conversion to REIT (less risky and
more liquid and transparent), I examine whether this change affects institutional investors’
preference for liquidity, prudent investment and trading strategy. Following Ciochetti et al.
(2002), I hypothesize that institutional investors may have a greater demand for liquidity as
they become the main investors of REIT shares. Similarly, prudent investment motives may
becomemore significant upon conversion to REIT to cater to institutional investors’ fiduciary
responsibility. On the other hand, we may not observe any change in preference towards
REIT shares by institutional investors if there is no significant change in ownership structure
and firm characteristics upon conversion to REIT.
3. Methodology
This paper uses an event study framework to identify the causal inference of REIT
conversion on institutional ownership. I first identify 25 conversion events during the period
from 2007 to 2016 as shown in Table 2. Many of these converted REITs were among the
Figure 1.




largest listed property companies in the United Kingdom prior to conversion. Note that Big
Yellow Group PLC’s conversion approval obtained at EGM on 4 May 2007 was backdated to
15 January, while Highcroft Investments PLC and Warner Estate Holdings PLC are not
included in the regression analysis due to data availability issues. This sample of converted
REITs is more than double the 12 conversion events studied by Brounen et al. (2013). The
event windows contain equally balanced two- and three-year event windows centred on
individual REITs’ conversion events. Similar to Devos et al. (2013), I exclude REIT quarters
where the sum of total ownership is larger than 100%. The aforementioned sample filtering
led to a final sample of 23 conversion events.
A fixed effects panel regression model is used to assess the impact of REIT conversion on
institutional ownership and the number of institutional investors. A Hausman test reveals
that the fixed effects model is preferred over the random effects model. All continuous
variables used in the regression analysis were winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile to
avoid the influence of extreme observations. The regression model is estimated as follows:
Insti: ownershipit ¼ α0 þ α1Convertit þ θ2Firm characteristicsit þ λ3Crisist þ fi þ εit (1)
No of insti: investorsit ¼α0 þ α1Convertit þ θ2Firm characteristicsit þ λ3Crisist þ fi
þ εit
(2)
The dependent variable of institutional ownership, or the total number of institutional
investors, is measured in each quarter for each individual REIT. Convert is a dummy
indicating quarters after conversion to REIT status. Firm characteristics consist of a vector
nine stock characteristics as in Bennett et al. (2003) and Devos et al. (2013) capturing
institutional investors’ prudent investment, liquidity and trading strategy motives.
Institutional investors that are bound by their fiduciary responsibility may place more
emphasis on prudent investment motives by holding less risky, older and high-yielding
stocks. I control for three risk measures: systematic risk (beta), total risks and firm-specific
risks. Liquidity is captured by firm size, share price and share turnover. Lastly, trading
strategy is captured by past stock performance. The time effect is captured by the Crisis
dummy variable that equals 1 for GFC years from 2007 to 2009 and 0 for non-crisis years. The
firm-level fixed effects are absorbed by fi, and ε is an error term.
In order to estimate the change in institutional investors’ preference prior to and after
conversion to REIT, I conduct subsample analysis on equations (1) and (2) by estimating
separately subsamples prior to and after converting to REIT. The difference in coefficient
values of these subsamples captures the change in preference of institutional investors with
regard to the estimated firm characteristics before and after the conversion event.
4. Data and summary statistics
The primary data for this study come from two sources. Stock prices and firm characteristic
variables are gathered from Datastream. Institutional ownership for each REIT for each
quarter surrounding the conversion event comes from S&P Capital IQ. The ownership data
for non-North American firms such as UK firms are sourced from global mutual fund
portfolio reports. S&P Capital IQ reports tabulate current and historical company-level
ownership information along with fund and institutional data. Institutional investors can be
categorized into the following four main groups: bank trusts, insurance companies, mutual
funds and investment advisors and other institutional investors (Devos et al., 2013).
Table 3 displays summary statistics for final sample comprising 460 firm-quarter
observations (23 conversion events). The average institutional ownership percentage by
quarter is 59.3%. Beta is obtained from a regression with the REIT monthly return on
monthly market return (FTSE All Share Index) over the previous 36 months. The average





deviation as measured over the previous 36 months using monthly REIT returns has a mean
of 7.0%. The third risk measure, firm-specific risk (the squared difference between monthly
returns and a property index (GPR 250 UK), summed by month and averaged over the most
recent three months), has a mean of 0.4%.
Firm size, defined as total equity market capitalization, has a mean of ₤1.357bn. This is
substantially larger than its median of ₤0.46bn due the presence of a few large REITs in my
sample. Average age (number of years onDatastream) of the REIT inmy sample is 25.7 years.
Dividend yield, measured as the average quarterly dividend yield over the most recent four-
quarters, averaged 3.7%. This ismuch lower than the 6.6%documented byDevos et al. (2013)
for US REITs. Price is the most recent stock price and carries a mean of ₤468.77. Turnover,
calculated as the ratio of monthly volume to the number of shares outstanding averaged over
the most recent three months, has a mean of 7.4%. Lag return, the compound annual growth
rate (CAGR) over the 36 months, has a mean of 8.1%.
Table 4 reports the correlations between variables in the regression model. Focussing on
the first two columns, I find significant positive correlations between institutional variables
(ownership and number of institutional investors) and the conversion dummy. This implies
the increased presence of institutional investors among listed property companies converted
to REITs. In addition, I find positive significant correlations between institutional variables
and liquidity variables (size, price and turnover) consistent with the prediction of the liquidity
motive. The evidence of the prudent investment motive is somewhat mixed, as in Bennett
et al. (2003). The negative (positive) significant relationship between firm-specific risk (age)
and institutional variables (number of institutional investors) is supportive of the prudent
investment motive. However, the correlation result between the beta and the number of
institutional investors does not support this motive.
5. Results
5.1 Time series evolution of institutional ownership
Figure 2 tracks the evolution of institutional ownership of converted REITs, FTSE All Share
Index and Global Property Research (GPR) 250 UK Index during 2004–2016. FTSE All Share
Index is a UK broad stock market index, while GPR 250 UK Index is a UK listed property
securities index. These time series data were on an upward trend during the period leading to
the formal adoption of the REIT regime on 1 January 2007. Listed property companies
enjoyed significantly higher price appreciation compared to other listed companies in
the United Kingdom, partly due to the strong expectation that the REIT regime will boost
the appeal of the UK commercial property sector to a broader class of investors [5].
The GPR250 UK Index increased by 117.4% between 2004Q1 and 2006Q4, much higher than
Mean Median Std. dev. Min Max
Insti. ownership 0.593 0.615 0.251 0.073 0.998
No of insti. investors 131.23 102.0 107.29 10 426
Conversion (0,1) 0.502 1 0.501 0 1
Beta 0.762 0.756 0.470 0.162 1.949
Standard dev 0.070 0.062 0.030 0.031 0.186
Firm-spec. risk 0.004 0.002 0.006 0 0.029
Firm size (£ million) 1356.96 456.84 1968.19 44.73 9146.38
Firm age (months) 25.67 23.46 14.78 3.75 45.50
Dividend yield 0.037 0.032 0.026 0 0.150
Price 468.77 306.69 508.45 33.0 2895.93
Turnover 0.074 0.057 0.063 0.032 0.242
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































the 46.6% registered by the FTSE All Share Index during the same period. Institutional
ownership of converted REITs was also in positive trajectory from the beginning of 2004.
A clear surge in institutional ownership was observed during the last two-quarters prior to
the adoption of the REIT regime, from 45.1% in 2006Q3 to 65.3% in 2006Q4. Unlike the stock
and property market indexes, which experienced steep drops during the GFC in 2007–2009,
the drop in institutional ownership is relatively mild. The percentage difference between the
peak and the minimum point during the GFC for institutional ownership, GPR250 UK index
and FTSE All Share index were 18.2%, 78.3% and 38.4%, respectively. A similar
pattern is also observed by Devos et al. (2013) in their sample of US REITs during GFC. The
post-crisis saw institutional ownership rebound to its pre-crisis levels.
5.2 Institutional ownership surrounding REIT conversion events
Figure 3 tracks individual REITs’ average institutional ownership three years before and
after the conversion event. This figure tracks both the movement of the original institutional
ownership (solid line) and the institutional ownership adjusted for the financial crisis impact
(dashed line) by replacing ownership data that fell in the GFC period (2007Q3 to 2010Q1) with
post-GFC period ownership data. Both lines are closely parallel with a correlation coefficient
of 0.99. This mitigates the concern that institutional ownership differs systematically
between GFC and post-GFC periods. Both measures of institutional ownership exhibit an
upward trend prior to the conversion event. Similar to Figure 2, a steep increase in
institutional ownership occurred during the last two-quarters prior to conversion, from
58.8% (2Q) to 75.0 (1Q). Institutional ownership was stabilized around 70% after the
conversion.
5.3 Univariate tests
Table 5 reports firm characteristics before and after converting to REIT. Consistent with
Figure 3, aggregate institutional ownership is significantly higher after conversion. Except
for beta and firm-specific risk, all variables that describe REIT characteristics are
significantly different between the pre- and post-conversion periods. Due to REIT’s
restrictive regulations, I expect former property companies in my sample to become less
risky, to paymore dividends and to becomemore liquid upon conversion to REIT. I find some





share index and GPR
250 UK index during
2004–2016
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converting to REITs. However, standard deviation of returns is higher while proxies for
liquidity (stock price and turnover) are lower post-conversion, which is contrary to my
expectation. Firm size, a proxy for liquidity, is nevertheless higher in the post-conversion
period.
5.4 Multivariate analysis
This section examines the impact of REIT conversion on the number of institutional investors
and institutional ownership in a multivariate framework. The dependent variables are
natural logarithm of number of institutional investors and the percentage of institutional
ownership in REIT in Columns (1) and (2), respectively. As shown in the correlation matrix in
Table 4, these two institutional variables are positive and significantly correlated to each
Before conversion After conversion
Mean Median Mean Median
Institutional ownership(%) 45.4 42.31 71.56*** 79.4***
Beta 0.693 0.664 0.686 0.746
Standard deviation (%) 6.52 5.77 7.57*** 7.22***
Firm-spec. risk (%) 0.28 0.17 0.26 0.14
Firm size (£ million) 999.75 262.76 1096.33 409.14***
Firm age (years) 23.09 18.92 26.85** 23.92***
Dividend yield (%) 3.2 2.60 4.1*** 4.3***
Stock price 386.62 300.5 318.76 187.0*
Turnover (%) 5.36 3.81 3.74*** 3.13**
Lag return (%) 17.66 17.3 4.27*** 5.9***
Note(s): ***, ** and * indicate whether mean (median) values are different from those in the pre-conversion













other at the 1% level (0.58). The key variable of interest is Conversion (0,1), which takes a
value of 1 for observations in the post-conversion period and 0 otherwise.
Table 6 reports the regression results. The coefficient for Conversion (0,1) is positive and
significant in Columns 1 and 2. The coefficient values imply that the number of institutional
investors and institutional ownership of property companies increased by 15.2 and 12.8%
respectively after conversion to REITs. This suggests that institutional investors were
attracted to the new REIT status of former property companies. Not tabulated here, I
document positive and significant (1% level) announcement effects of REIT conversion
events with cumulative abnormal returns of 1.17% (CAR,1,þ1) using market model event
methodology. This suggests that the conversion events were well received by the stock
market. This could be due to the potential benefits associated with conversion to REIT
discussed earlier. The increase could also be driven by the ownership rules (five or fewer and
10% substantial shareholders rules) that prevent substantial ownership of REIT by
corporate shareholders. There could be a switch in ownership structure between corporate
shareholders and institutional investors prior to the conversion event in order to meet the
REIT ownership requirement. Overall, these findings support the claims of the REIT regime’s
(1) (2)
Dependent variable Log (no of insti inv) Insti. ownership
Intercept 2.273*** 1.177*
(4.42) (1.86)





Standard deviation 0.225 1.053*
(0.22) (1.79)
Firm-spec. risk 0.691 2.067
(0.55) (1.50)
Log (firm age) 2.121*** 0.013
(6.28) (0.03)
Dividend yield 1.476 1.082
(1.05) (1.38)
Liquidity motive
Log (firm size) 0.021 0.058
(0.18) (0.44)





Lag return 0.136 0.265**
(0.69) (2.53)
Crisis (0,1) 0.143*** 0.116***
(3.31) (3.55)
Firm effects Yes Yes
R2 within 0.72 0.54
No. obs 460 460
Note(s): T-statistics are reported in the parentheses with robust standard errors. ***, ** and * refer to





proponents that the introduction of the REIT regime will attract greater participation from
institutional investors and help in creating a larger investor base.
Turning our attention to other explanatory variables designed to capture institutional
investors’ investment motives, I do not find consistent support for institutional investors’
prudent investment motive as proxied by risk variables (beta, standard deviation and firm-
specific risk), firm age and dividend yield. None of the risk variables carry the correct
negative and significant coefficient value in Columns (1) and (2). The significant positive
coefficients of beta and standard deviation are contrary to the prediction of prudent
investment motive. The positive and significant coefficient of the firm age variable in Column
(1), on the other hand, supports the prudent investment consideration of institutional
investors.
Institutional investors’ preference for liquidity is supported by the positive and significant
coefficients of price and turnover. The results could be driven by the large position and
frequent trading of institutional investors that make them demand stocks with high liquidity
(Gompers and Metrick, 2001). The negative and significant coefficient of lag return suggests
that institutional investors in our sample were not momentum investors. The negative
coefficient of lag return is inconsistent with the positive relationship between REIT
performance and institutional ownership documented by Downs (1998) and Chan et al. (2003).
The positive and significant Crisis (0,1) coefficient captures the significant rise in
institutional ownership upon the introduction of the REIT regime in the United Kingdom
in 2007 that coincided with the beginning of the GFC as shown in Figures 2 and 3.
Next, I examine whether institutional investors’ preferences towards firm characteristics
of former property companies changed after these companies were converted to REITs. I do
this by splitting the full sample period into pre- and post-conversion periods. I formally test
whether institutional investors have changed their investment preferences by comparing the
coefficients between the pre- and post-conversion subsample using seemingly unrelated
estimations. Columns (3) and (4) in Table 7 report subsample results for pre- and post-
conversion, respectively. Column (5) presents the results of the coefficient comparison
between pre- and post-conversion subsamples. The null hypothesis is that the coefficient
estimates in the pre-conversion subsample equal those of the post-conversion subsample.
The results in Column (5) indicate that we can reject the null hypothesis of no change in
institutional investors’ preference for five of the nine characteristics. I observe somewhat
mixed results for the prudent investment motives. In particular, the coefficients of beta and
firm age show that institutional investors significantly decreased (increased) their
preferences for securities with high systematic risks (older firms), suggesting that
institutional investors value the prudent investment characteristics of converted REITs.
However, the coefficients of standard deviation (firm-specific risk) suggest decreasing
aversion (increasing willingness) towards risky securities by institutional investors.
Interestingly, dividend yield, which is an important consideration for investing in REIT
shares, is not significant and carries the wrong negative signs in both subsamples. However,
the negative sign of dividend yield is consistent with previous studies on general firms and
REITs (Gompers andMetrick, 2001; Bennett et al., 2003; Devos et al., 2013). Lastly, I observe a
weaker preference for holding liquid securities proxied by Log (Price) after the conversion
event. This finding is inconsistent with the transaction cost prediction, wherein institutional
investors have a stronger preference for liquidity, as holding of REIT shares increases in the
post-conversion period (Ciochetti et al., 2002).
Collectively, these findings suggest institutional investors changed their preference for
risk, firm age and liquidity after the conversion event by placing more emphasis on firm-
specific risk and firm age and less emphasis on systematic risk and liquidity [6]. The finding
on the change in preference for liquidity may capture institutional investors’ perceived






This study is the first to examine the impact of conversion to REIT status on the dynamic of
institutional ownership. Focussing on a sample of UK listed property investment companies
that chose to convert to REITs, I find institutional ownership increased by 12.8%, while the
total number of institutional investors increased by 15.2%, upon conversion to REITs. This
implies that the REIT structure managed to attract the interest of institutional investors.
Similar to Bennett et al. (2003), I find consistent evidence supporting the liquidity preference
of institutional investors in holding REIT shares. This preference for liquidity is, however,
reduced in importance (though still significant) after the conversion event, where institutional
investors are found to be more willing to hold less liquid REIT shares. This change in
preference reflects the perceived increase in the liquidity of converted REITs by institutional
investors.
Findings from this study have implications for countries that are considering introducing
the REIT structure into their capital market. Evidence from the UK market reveals that the
REIT structure does increase the appeal of property securities to institutional investors. All
else being equal, this should lead to greater liquidity and valuation for listed property
securities. Findings from this study are also valuable to countries without a formal
Dependent variable
Institutional ownership Coefficients comparison test
(3) (4) (5)




Beta 0.202*** 0.023 22.45***
(3.76) (1.33)
Standard deviation 4.132** 0.148 9.74***
(2.68) (0.33)
Firm-spec. risk 5.838 2.755** 6.85***
(1.58) (2.49)
Log (firm age) 0.883 0.721** 5.06**
(0.91) (2.15)
Dividend yield 0.265 0.573 0.07
(0.15) (1.55)
Liquidity motive
Log (firm size) 0.215 0.076 0.58
(1.16) (0.79)
Log (price) 0.894*** 0.292** 4.89**
(2.84) (2.09)
Turnover 0.138 0.070 0.37
(0.27) (0.68)
Trading strategy
Lag return 0.061 0.070 0.00
(0.30) (0.68)
Crisis (0,1) 0.336*** 0.003 12.26***
(3.72) (0.17)
Firm effects Yes Yes
R2 within 0.36 0.21
No. obs 229 231
Note(s):T-statistics are reported in the parentheses with robust standard errors. Chi-square value *** and **






conversion mechanism (e.g. Japan and Singapore). The UK experience suggests that the
existence and the relaxation of REIT conversion rules can significantly reduce the entry
barriers for existing property companies to become REITs, thus improving the overall
transparency and liquidity of the indirect property market.
The acceptance of UKREITs by institutional investors also has implications for converted
REITs’ financing policies. The quality certification of institutional investment and the access
to the REIT brand may allow converted REITs to have better access to debt and equity
markets at a lower cost compared to their pre-conversion period. Research from the US REIT
sector has shown that cost of going public is lower for IPO issueswith significant institutional
participation (Ling and Ryngaert, 1997). Moreover, US REITs are found to raise more equity
and debt (frequency and dollar value) in the post-1990 period, during the time at which the
ownership of REIT shares was dominated by institutional investors.
I contend that the validity of the main finding of the positive impact of conversion on
institutional variables is sound based on convincing graphical evidence supported by an
event study approach that addresses the endogeneity problem associated with firms’ choice
to convert to REITs. It would certainly be interesting to expand this study to other REIT
regimes with conversion rules and examine the impact of REIT conversion on the ownership
structure of different types of institutional investors. I leave the generalizability of my
conclusions, which are drawn from a small sample of converted REITs in the United
Kingdom, to future research.
Notes
1. Devos et al. (2013) report that institutional investors owned an average of 47.32% of US REIT shares
during 2004–2010. In Asia, Wong et al. (2013) show that institutional investors collectively owned
44.8% of the Asian REIT IPO shares.
2. REITs in Singapore and Japan in Brounen’s sample were formed through the IPO process, not
through conversion of existing listed companies. The pre-conversion firm characteristics for
Singapore and Japan REITs were actually obtained from non-REITs prior to the introduction of the
REIT regime in these countries.
3. Specifically, UK REITs must distribute 90% of their net property rental income, at least 75% of a
REIT’s total assets and net profits must be derived from the property rental business and they
cannot be controlled by five or fewer shareholders (a single shareholder limit of 10%). In addition to
these, UK REITs have to be listed on a recognized exchange (i.e. no private REITs) and maintain an
interest coverage ratio of at least 1.25 times measured by the ratio of property profits to
financing costs.
4. There were in total nine REIT IPOs during our study period of 2007–2016. Themean underpricing of
seven IPOs for which we have information is 6.1% (median: 2.0%).
5. The REIT conceptwas first acknowledged in the pre-budget report of 2003 and became the subject of
draft legislation in December 2005.
6. Not tabulated here, I have also experimented with Log (No of institutional investors) as the
dependent variable. Similar to Table 4, I find institutional investors place less emphasis on
systematic risk and liquidity after the conversion event. However, unlike Table 4, we find
institutional investors place more emphasis on dividend yield (positive and significant) during the
post-conversion period. We also find institutional investors put significantly less emphasis on firm
size and trading strategy under this regression specification.
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